images licensed by ingram publishing T he need for cleaner and more efficient electrical power generation along with limited funds for the construction of bulk generation and transmission facilities has motivated power system utilities to deploy distributed energy resources (DERs). Onsite generation by DERs offers various economic and environmental benefits for end customers, utilities, and society. These benefits include enhanced reliability and resilience of power delivery systems and deferment of investments for bulk generation, transmission, and distribution expansions. Furthermore, DER integration may lead to lower losses at the transmission-system level and emission reduction of large fossil-fueled power plants [1], [2] . DER integration has modified the conventional, centralized bulk generation concept and introduced new notions, such as the microgrid (µG) [3] .
Toward a New Protection Paradigm Subsequent to Distributed Energy Resource Integration
capabilit y, a ll controlled by an intelligent µG management system. Although, from the viewpoint of the upstream network, a µG is seen as an aggregated controllable load/generation in the point of common coupling (PCC), the main grid is no longer the first and last opportunity for load supply. Through the seamless transfer from grid-connected to islanded operation of the µG, the load may not be interrupted when a blackout occurs in the main grid. This feature mainly results in the enhancement of reliability and resiliency metrics of the power delivery system [4] , [5] . However, despite those advantages, large-scale implementation of ac and dc µGs presents technical challenges and barriers associated with their control, protection, and coordination with the main grid [6] - [12] . In addition to adequate business models, reliable protection systems (PSs) are a prerequisite of longterm, secure, and economically efficient operation of a power system. The PS aims to isolate the faulted part of a power system as quickly as possible, while preserving the integrity and stability of the remaining system [13] , consequently avoiding further damage to the faulted equipment and reducing stress on the rest of equipment as much as possible. A key feature of an efficient PS is reliability, which of course would be violated when the PS does not operate as is expected. This leads to a two-pronged definition of PS reliability: dependability and security. Dependability is the degree of certainty that the PS would react to a fault for which it is committed, and security is the measure of certainty that the PS would not respond to an irrelevant fault [13] . In addition, a PS should be sensitive, speedy, and selective. An abnormal condition should be detected (sensitivity) in the least amount of time (speedy) and cleared by de-energizing a minimum portion of power system (selective) [14] .
Conventional distribution systems (DSs), as radial passive networks, were subjected to unidirectional power flows. These systems were mostly protected by current-based protection devices (PDs). Overcurrent, earth fault for which it is committed, and recloser relays with appropriate time-current characteristics have become effective industrial practices in conventional DSs for many years. Economic issues are the key reason for vast deployment of this kind of PD in conventional DSs. Current magnitude is the individual decision-making index for current-based PDs. Accurate operation of these PDs would be influenced by factors affecting the fault current magnitude. These factors include the Thevenin equivalent impedance seen from the upstream network, fault type and resistance, and grounding strategy. In addition, their coordination is somehow difficult if different time-current characteristics are deployed by PDs [15] , [16] .
In µGs, bidirectional power flows imposed by DERs together with continual fault-level variation caused by different operating modes, i.e., grid connected or islanded, would jeopardize current-based protection schemes. In addition, grounding strategies and interference of µG control with protection schemes, especially in the case of islanded-operation mode, are significant factors in rendering current-based PDs inadequate to procure a reliable protection scheme for µGs. The following issues raise new challenges in µG protection [17] - [24] :
■ grounding strategy ■ DER integration ■ islanded and grid-connected operating modes ■ interference of µG operation and control with its protection. Designing reliable protection schemes for µGs requires elaborating and resolving emerging challenges. Although some of the aforementioned issues could be moderately solved by reprogramming or resetting conventional PDs, their complete solution may require new protection approaches. PSs must become more "active" and "adaptive" to fulfill the security and dependability requirements of µG protection. Current-based PDs are incapable of realizing these requirements; thus, new intelligent electronic device (IED)-based PDs with seamless communication capabilities should be essentially accommodated. Such new industrial electronic devices combined with communication-based protection schemes would present viable approaches to tackle the aforementioned issues. Additionally, synchrophasor measurement technology (SMT) can provide an effective platform to concentrate the systemwide time-synchronized data in the µG supervision, control, and protection center that can result in issuing more reliable commands [25] .
This article explores emerging protection challenges associated with DER-integrated ac µGs. The main goal of the article is to highlight the inadequacy of conventional current-based protection schemes subsequent to DER integration. We first discuss grounding system issues from the protection point of view. Then we investigate proper DER-associated grounding strategies that meet the minimum requirements of PDs. We address the impact of DER integration on conventional current-based PDs including sensitivity matter, sympathetic tripping, and reclosing difficulties. Initiatives are proposed to overcome the aforementioned challenges. We outline the interference of control and operation schemes with protection countermeasures in the subsequent section. Finally, we discuss possible solutions based on existing PDs or new advanced technologies, e.g., IEDs and SMT, for dealing with protection issues following DER integration.
Grounding System
Power systems are challenged with numerous types of faults, such as earth faults. Phase-to-ground (P2G) faults are the most common earth fault for which adoption of a proper grounding system from both safety and protection perspectives is crucial. System grounding is intentionally connecting a neutral conductor to the ground for the following purposes [26] : ■ provide a flow path for currents circulating from the ground route, consequently detecting an unwanted connection between system conductors and the ground, i.e., P2G faults ■ restrict undesirable overvoltage with respect to the earth or ground, within tolerable limits. These targets have led to two sorts of electrical and protective grounding concepts. In the context of the former, the metallic body of electrical equipment should be grounded to alleviate undesirable voltages, e.g., touch voltage, consequently avoiding electric-shock hazards during P2G faults. On the contrary, the idea of protective grounding aims to detect fault current in the case of P2G faults. For current-based PDs, fault current magnitude is a vital index for fault diagnosis. In the case of earth fault occurrence, the grounding system has a key role in ground fault current magnitude by manipulating the fault current contribution of sources. The fault current contribution of each source is directly affected by the fault current path impedance, including ground impedance in a P2G fault. Adoption of a proper grounding strategy is thus crucial for providing reliable protection of ac µGs. In this section, we discuss pros and cons of various protective grounding strategies and conclude with appropriate grounding strategies associated with a variety of DERs.
Grounding Strategies
Grounding strategies include solidly grounded systems, ungrounded systems (isolated ground), and grounded systems via impedance schemes. In the case of solidly grounded systems, a neutral point is connected to the ground through a roughly zero impedance. From a protection perspective, fault diagnosis by current-based PDs and their coordination could be easily accomplished owing to the high short circuit current magnitude. On the other hand, overvoltage appearing during healthy phases of P2G faults is at a minimum. Accordingly, the resultant voltage stress on equipment insulation is low, and a lower level of insulation may be deployed. An arrester with lower-rated voltage could be also used. However, high P2G fault current may cause thermal and mechanical difficulties. For instance, windings of transformers might be deformed, due to resultant extensive electromechanical forces.
Solid grounding strategies may lead to protection difficulties after DER integration. To illustrate this, see Figure 1 , which depicts a portion of a µG. For a P2G fault occurring at point F in the figure, the fault would be supplied by both the main grid and DER1. Because the main grid is solidly grounded, the major share of fault current would be provided by the main grid. Apart from restrictions imposed by the DER1 generator model, its fault current contribution may be further impacted by the associated grounding strategy. For instance, DER1 would suffer from limited fault current contribution if it was grounded via impedance. Hence, the sensitivity of the PD associated with DER1 (PD2) may be at risk. In extreme conditions, with the presence of a fault resistance, PD2 may even become blind to the fault, whereas the fault could be easily detected by PD1. In such a case, the P2G fault current contribution of DERs should not be restricted as much as the associated PDs miss their sensitivities. To this end, the grounding strategy of DERs must be designed with respect to the grounding approach of the main grid. This matter could be solved using new protection approaches based on communicationenabled IEDs (see the "Looking to the Future" section).
The counterpart of the solidly grounded system is an ungrounded system that may be developed in very special cases such as DSs supplying petrochemical industries. For such rare cases, protection schemes are very different from those of conventional DSs. In the ungrounded system, the only route for earth fault current is the shunt capacitors of the feeders. The shunt capacitor of the distribution feeder is extensively low, which can highly limit the short circuit current. In this case, the load supply would not be interrupted due to the low-magnitude P2G fault current. The low-magnitude fault current is incapable of causing significant thermal and electromechanical problems, but such a system endures high levels of overvoltage. In addition, ungrounded systems are prone to ferroresonances. When a P2G fault occurs, the sound phases would suffer from overvoltage, which would likely cause insulation failures. The fault current flows through the shunt capacitor of feeders, and this capacitive fault current may also bring capacitive restrike problems. Due to the low fault current magnitude, isolated systems could not be protected by means of current-based PDs. The solution is to deploy voltage-based protection schemes. However, an acute drawback for voltage-based protection is the nonselective characteristic of the voltage as a protection index. Voltage-based PDs are usually fed by voltage transformers (VTs) that are located at the distribution bus, to which numerous feeders may be connected. As a result, the parent bus would be subjected to overvoltage at the event of a fault occurrence in each of the feeders. Accordingly, the trip command would be transmitted to all incoming feeders, and loads on the sound feeders would be interrupted for an irrelevant fault. This nonselective characteristic of the voltage signal indurates the faultlocating process.
The compromise between solidly grounded and isolated systems is to accomplish the grounding system by means of nonzero impedance. IEEE Std. 142-2007 classifies this type of grounding strategy into high-impedance, low-impedance, and effectively grounded categories [26] . As discussed earlier, in a solidly grounded system wherein the grounding impedance is roughly zero, the earth fault current magnitude is high, and the overvoltage level is at a minimum. On the contrary, if the grounding impedance is infinite, i.e., in ungrounded systems, this would produce a minimum magnitude earth fault current and maximum overvoltage. Accordingly, the earth fault current and overvoltage factors act conversely while varying the grounding impedance from zero to infinity. These factors could be adjusted by the strategy of grounding with impedance. There are different policies for sizing the grounding impedance. The most typical plans are the following:
■ retain the P2G fault current and temporary overvoltage indices within satisfactory protection and insulation criteria ■ restrict the P2G fault current to the approximate nominal current of the associated upstream transformer. Grounding with impedance can be deployed using both wye and delta winding arrangements. With the wye connection, the neutral point could be grounded via inductive, capacitive, or resistive impedance. But due to the overvoltage, resonance, and ferroresonance issues, grounding by capacitors is not recommended. Neutral grounding resistors (NGRs) may be the most practical and efficient choice when using the grounding with impedance strategy.
In the case of the delta connection, because no neutral point is accessible, an artificial neutral point should be created. Figure 2 (a) illustrates this approach, in which the artificial neutral point is formed by impedances. Again, impedances may be inductive, capacitive, or resistive. In this case, use of resistance and inductance is not recommended due to active and reactive losses. In some special cases, starconnected capacitor banks installed for reactive power compensation purposes may be used for creating the artificial neutral point as a byproduct.
To minimize leakage in shunt current of the artificial ground system, the element used should offer high impedance during the normal operating mode. However, this element should also act as low impedance during the fault. Three-phase transformers with YNd or zigzag winding configurations are appropriate elements to accomplish this. In the case of a normal operating mode, only a no-load current would pass through the grounding transformer. In this instance, the grounding transformer would operate as a high impedance, representing its associated positive sequence onsite generation by dErs offers various economic and environmental benefits for end customers, utilities, and society.
impedance. However, the P2G fault current would be faced with zero sequence impedance of the grounding transformer, which is impressively lower than that of positive impedance. Figure 2 (b) depicts a sample grounding transformer. Use of the zigzag grounding transformer is common when the neutral point of the main transformer is inaccessible.
DER Grounding Schemes
The typical connections of DERs to µGs include unit-and bus-connected configurations. Unit-connected DERs are coupled to the µG using appropriate transformers. However, bus-connected DERs are directly connected to the µG at a low-voltage level. The unbalanced fault current, specifically the P2G fault, could vastly jeopardize solidly grounded synchronous machinebased DERs. In the case of unbalanced faults, magnetic flux caused by the negative sequence current may heat the rotor. Hence, the fault current supplied by the generator should be constrained as much as possible to meet its physical limitations. However, a cornerstone requirement of current-based PDs is that their accurate operation necessitates fault current provision by resources for a given period of time. This is referred to as the fault ride-through requirement of PDs. In each network, fulfilling this requirement depends on the model of resources as well as the network structure. The grounding system is a key factor that can affect the earth fault current and consequently the fault ride-through requirement of PDs. The grounding system must be designed in such a way that generators would remain free of damage during a P2G fault while still satisfying PD requirements. (For the interested reader, more about fault ride-through requirements can be found in [27] - [31] .)
For unit-connected DERs, the neutral point of unit transformer (interface transformer) must be grounded using low impedance to meet the PDs requirement. Figure 3 depicts a sample unit-connected DER. Because the neutral point of the interface transformer is grounded using a low-impedance NGR, the requirement of PD1 is satisfied for the fault occurring at point B in the figure. In addition, due to the delta connection of the transformer winding at the generator side, the zero sequence current would not pass through the generator. Because the generator is grounded via a high-impedance NGR, for the P2G fault at point A, the low fault current would pass through the generator. The fault current can be restricted to a specific value by proper calculation of the generator grounding NGR, say 10 A.
To limit the P2G fault current passing through the generator in bus-connected generators, we recommend a high-impedance NGR. Here, the fault would be predominantly fed by the main grid in the case of a grid-connected operating mode. However, the fault ride-through requirement of the current-based PD would not be satisfied in the islanded-operating mode. In other words, the short circuit level is considerably low in this condition; therefore, if a high-impedance grounding strategy is adopted for the DERs, the fault current would additionally be attenuated. In this case, the most effective grounding strategy would be a low-impedance NGR. Accordingly, the grounding strategy of bus-connected DERs must be adaptive with respect to operating mode. In other words, the grounding system must automatically switch between high-and low-impedance NGRs in the case of grid-connected and islanded-operating modes, respectively. (More information on DER grounding strategies may be found in [32] - [36] .)
DER-Integration Impact
DER integration in conventional DSs brings about technical challenges associated with control, protection, and operation. From the protection perspective, bidirectional power flows subsequent to DER integration make it neither secure nor dependable to use conventional current-based protection schemes. Designing a reliable protection approach for µGs necessitates careful elaboration of DER impact on PD operation. Fault current routes would be altered after DER integration; hence, PDs may not sense when the fault is notably severe. In addition, such a circumstance may result in initiation of irrelevant PDs and consequently the interruption of more loads. Last but not least, multipath provision of the fault may jeopardize fast load-restoration strategies, e.g., the reclosing process. The most significant impacts of DER connection, which we discuss in the sections that follow, are ■ sensitivity matters ■ sympathetic tripping issues ■ reclosing difficulties.
Sensitivity Matters
For conventional DSs, the fault current is fed by a single source. However, in µGs, DERs also contribute to the fault current, which, in turn, might deteriorate the sensitivity of PDs. For the sake of clarity, consider the the µG depicted in Figure 4 . Before DER integration, the fault current is only provided by the main grid, which is dependent on the Thevenin equivalent voltage and impedance of upstream network, feeder impedance, and fault resistance. On the contrary, after DER integration, the main grid contribution to the fault current would be directly affected by the fault current share of the DER. As depicted in Figure 4 , by a given relatively large Z 12 value, PD1 may become blind to downstream faults for a large fault current contribution of DER and for a high fault resistance value. In other words, as the DER location gets closer to the PD1, its influence on sensitivity matters of PD1 becomes more severe. Hence, the sensitivity of PDs would be jeopardized after DER integration. This problem is remarkable because PDs approaching the utility grid are faced with sensitivity decrement issues that can endanger power system stability and reliability. The story does not end here because the sensitivity issue may be intensified in the presence of fault resistance. Depending on the amount of fault resistance, upstream PDs of the DER may also underreach and remain stable even under the fault.
Sympathetic Tripping
As a basic rule of power system protection, the fault should be cleared by de-energizing a minimum part of the system. According to Figure 1 , although the DER1, main grid, and DER2 contribute to the fault current,
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FIGUre 4 -the sensitivity problem following Der integration.
dEr integration in conventional dss brings about technical challenges associated with control, protection, and operation viewpoints.
PD3 and PDs associated with DER2 should remain stable for the fault occurring at point F. However, when the contribution of DER2 to the fault current is high, the sympathetic tripping of PD3 and DER2 protection are inevi- 
DERs and Recloser Relays
Power system faults can be classified as temporary or permanent, but most fall into the temporary category. In the case of temporary faults, the fault factor, e.g., pollution, moisture, etc., would be subsequently eliminated by the flashover occurrence, allowing the equipment to be immediately reenergized. The reclosing idea is based on this philosophy, and the tripped circuit breaker would be reclosed after a certain dead time, in the hopes that the fault was temporary. A successful reclose can occur under special conditions. De-energizing the faulted feeder is the basis of one successful reclose. In addition, successful reclose along with minimum blacked-out area can be realized if another PD exists that is able to isolate the fault. For conventional DSs, a successful reclose command can be fulfilled due to the unidirectional power supply. However, reclosing schemes must be revised after DER integration. For the sake of clarification, see Figure  5 , in which a portion of the µG is shown where fault clearance requires tripping of both PD1 and PD2. Therefore, in addition to outgoing feeder relays, all DERs on the feeder should also be equipped with recloser units. Moreover, a reliable and successful reclose dictates coordinated operation of PDs; otherwise, this can lead to major problems even in the case of temporary faults. Consider that in Figure 5 the fault location is close to PD1, and hence PD1 may operate faster than PD2. For a short dead time associated with the recloser function of PD1, it is probable that PD2 remains stable. Thus, the fault would be supplied by DER1. By reclosing PD1, it would switch on to fault, resulting in an unsuccessful reclose. Such a complication could be resolved by deferring the operation of PD1 by means of some intentional delays. This simple example illustrates that the reclosing criterion is not fulfilled even for a temporary fault. Moreover, an additional stress is imposed on both the utility grid and DER.
Interference of µG Operation and Control with Protection
Power system protection, especially current-based schemes, may be adversely influenced by numerous factors, including system topology, operating point, and the control strategy of resources. These elements are mostly imposed by system operation and control strategies, so power system protection should be capable of making accurate decisions under these conditions. In this section, we discuss the impact of µG operation and the consequences and interference of control strategies for its protection.
Consequence of Operation Strategies
Conventiona l DSs a re ba sica lly designed in a loop configuration. However, due to safety concerns and technical difficulties, radial configuration is generally deployed in the normal operating mode. Radial configuration in DSs can be accomplished by revising the open/close state of switches in the basic loop-designed network. Due to the high number of switches, various configurations can be offered for distribution networks. To realize specific operational destinations, expedient reconfiguration is a common measure for loss reduction, voltage profile improvement, and electrification of interrupted loads. System radial operation is the main constraint of reconfiguration approaches. In light of various unidirectional power flows provided by radial configuration, the reliable operation of currentbased protection schemes must rarely be sacrificed. Figure 6 (a) shows a portion of a conventional DS. Suppose that, in the base case, all switches are closed except the tie switch (shown as S9 in the figure). As obvious from Figure 6 (a), each feeder would be protected by associated PDs, e.g., PD1, PD3, and PD4 for feeder 1 and PD2 for feeder 2. Dependability and security criteria for protection schemes necessitate a coordinated operation of PD1 with PD3 and PD4. Coordination is defined as the existence of enough time difference, referred to as the coordination time interval (CTI), between operation of the main relay and the backup. The CTI includes operation time of the main relay and the associated circuit breaker, as well as overshoot time of the backup relay plus an appropriate safety margin. Supposing the PDs as the inverse definite minimum time overcurrent relays, the time-current characteristic as well as the pickup current and time dial setting (TDS) are the parameters to be tuned. These must be set to meet the coordination constraint. For instance, for a fault at point F in the figure, relay settings associated with PD3 and PD1 must be tuned such that the time difference between operation of these PDs is equal to or greater than the CTI, e.g., 250 ms. Similar coordination logic must be established between PD4 and PD2. Assume that an operation strategy offers to reconfigure the network by making the tie switch (S9 in the figure) and breaking S2. Hence, buses 3, 4, and 5 would be supplied by the other feeder while satisfying the radial operation constraint. Referring to Figure 6(a) , again the feeders can be properly protected by the aforementioned PDs; however, in this case, PD2 must be coordinated with PD3 and PD4. The reliable protection of this system can be accomplished by defining proper group settings for both PD1 and PD2. Each group contains PD settings associated with a specific circumstance. For instance, for the aforementioned example, the group settings would be as follows: is open. In this circumstance, appropriate current settings would be set for all PDs. In addition, the TDSs relevant to PD2, PD3, and PD4 could be adopted independently. However, to assure proper protection coordination, the TDS associated with PD1 must be set with respect to the TDSs of PD3 and PD4. ■ Group 2: This group should be deployed when S9 is closed and S2 is open. Similar to group 1, appropriate current settings would be tuned for all PDs. Additionally, the TDSs relevant to PD1, PD3, and PD4 could be adopted independently, whereas the TDS associated with PD2 would be coordinated with the TDSs of PD3 and PD4.
To scrutinize the consequence of operation strategy in the presence of DERs, see Figure 6 (b). After DER integration, the coordinated operation of PD1, PD3, and PD4 would be as the preceding case of group 1.
PD2 and PD5 can also be set independently. However, the aforementioned reconfiguration plan enforces not only coordinated operation of PD2 with PD3 and PD4, but even PDs associated with DER1 (PD5) must be coordinated with downstream PDs (PD3 and PD4). Therefore, in addition to PD1 and PD2, group settings would be crucial for proper PD5 operation. The problem becomes more complicated for largescale systems with numerous DERs and switches offering a vast variety of configurations. Some solutions based on intelligent protection schemes have been proposed to deal with these factors [22] , [38] . In conclusion, reliable protection of µGs obligates the careful elaboration of operation maneuvers and plans.
Consequence of Control Strategies
Although the philosophy of power system control and that of protection are based on different goals, the consequence of power system control strategies on performance of protection schemes is indisputable. The control approaches try to keep the lights on during different operating conditions and under various disturbances. On the contrary, the PS acts on special occasions, e.g., faulty conditions, with the aim of removing the abnormality. The PDs are such masterminds of the PS that their accurate operation needs fulfillment of some requirements by control countermeasures. This is the origin of interference between power system protection and control tasks. As previously mentioned, the fault ridethrough necessity can be considered a vital requirement for current-based PDs. To satisfy this requirement, controllers must be able to manipulate sources to provide the required magnitude of fault current within a specific period of time.
For bulk power systems with stabilized bus voltages, PD requirements could be easily fulfilled, and thus the role of the control system is usually overlooked. Likewise, because conventional DSs are fed only by the main grid, the consequence of control schemes on their protection is negligible. However, protection of µGs is directly affected by associated control schemes, particularly in the case of islandedoperating mode. For µGs incorporating a wide variety of inverter-based DERs (IBDERs), the fault ride-through requirement is a major concern. During fault, the firing pattern of IBDERs must be revisited to restrict the fault current contribution of IBDERs and protect associated power electronic switches. As a result, the contribution of IBDERs to the fault current would be quenched. In addition, the swift fault current damping phenomenon offered by induction generator-based wind turbines intensifies the fault ride-through issue. The problem, however, could be tackled by developing efficient control plans, particularly for doubly fed induction generators.
The fault ride-through requirement may also be imperiled by control strategies associated with synchronous generator-based DERs (SGBDERs). During faulty conditions, the high-magnitude fault current passing through the feeder inductances would result in high reactive losses and inductive current. This inductive current and reactive demand must be supplied by resources to satisfy the fault ride-through requirement of PDs. For SGBDERs, the excitation system is responsible for voltage control and reactive power provision. Hence, the excitation system of SGBDERs and the associated controller would have a key role in satisfying the fault ridethrough requirement of PDs in µGs. For economic reasons, a self-excited (shunt) excitation system is broadly deployed in small-scale SGBDERs. Figure 7 (a) depicts an outline of the shunt excitation system, wherein the associated terminal voltage of the synchronous machine is used to supply the field current. According to Figure 7 (a), the current transformer (CT) and the VT provide feedback signals for the automatic control system; however, the power potential transformer is responsible for supplying the excitation system. Despite being an inexpensive solution, this system is unsuitable for realizing the fault ride-through constraint of PDs. During faults, voltage drop of the terminal would be reflected to the excitation system. Hence, this system would lag on occasions when the system needs urgent backing of the excitation system. Such an incompetency contravenes the fault ride-through requirement of the PDs and consequently imperils their accurate operation. The problem could be mitigated by taking advantage of a power CT, as depicted in Figure 7 (b). At the event of faults during which the current magnitude is high, the excitation system would be supplied by the power CT. Once the proper inputs are provided for the excitation system, its controller meets PD requirements. In conclusion, adopting expedient control strategies in µGs is of crucial prominence, even from the protection perspective. µG protection performance must wisely be elaborated along with the design and tuning of µG control schemes.
Looking to the Future
Reliable protection of future DER-integrated DSs and µGs necessitates an advanced protection paradigm. DERintegration impacts on DS protection could be resolved using four classes of protection countermeasures. These countermeasures in descending priority order are as follows.
1) Reprogramming existing local
PDs. The first and simplest solution is to recoordinate existing current-based PDs to compensate for the negative influence of DERs on DS protection. This approach seeks to fulfill the protection coordination in the presence of DERs by revising PDs settings, i.e., the pickup current and TDS. However, not all DER-integration issues can be resolved by this approach. ■ Sensitivity: Regarding this matter, a recoordination scheme could be somewhat efficient. PDs must be set to be more sensitive in the presence of DERs than in their absence. For instance, the pickup current of PD1 in Figure 4 could be revised so that the decreasing impact of DER on the current, sensed by PD1, becomes compensated for. This approach works when DER penetration is low. For cases with proliferated DER penetration, because the reduced level of short circuit current seen by PD1 would be close to the load current, recoordination would not alleviate the problem. ■ Sympathetic tripping: To tackle this difficulty, the PD settings must be set so that the trip command by PDs of the sound feeder is not issued for a fault at the other feeder. For instance, PDs associated with DER2 as well as PD3 should not issue a trip command when the fault is at point F in Figure 1 . To accomplish this, the time setting of the PDs must be increased. However, this increment would cause additional delay in clearing the faults corresponding to these PDs. ■ Reclosing: For solving reclosing issues in DER-integrated DSs, the dead time of the recloser must be readjusted. For instance, the dead time associated with PD1 in Figure 5 must be set so that the reclosing command of PD1 is issued after the operation of PD2. In other words, the reclosing dead time must be increased. This increment postpones fast reclosing action that may be harmful for the sensitive loads in the µG.
■ Consequence of operation strategies:
In DER-integrated DSs, operation strategies alter power flow paths, which in turn obligate PD settings revision. Owing to the diversity of operation maneuvers, conventional local PDs cannot tackle this challenge, and agent-based approaches must be deployed [39] . ■ Consequence of control strategies: The PD requirement, e.g., the fault ride-through requirement, is the key source of interference between power system protection and control systems that could not be tackled by reprogramming of the PDs. 2) Deploying directional PDs. In this approach, a new directional PD is used to provide appropriate functionality in DER-integrated DSs. Deployment of directional PDs could be efficient in tackling protection issues originating from the bidirectional power flow attribute. [24] , [38] , and [42] . In addition, SMT could be competent in handling interference between µG control and protection measures. To meet PD requirements, a special µG-wide control scheme must be devised to take advantage of µG-wide time-synchronized data. A summary of the previous discussions is outlined in Table 1 . As can be seen in the table, some parts of the challenges could be tackled by reprogramming existing PDs. However, remaining issues must be attacked by the use of new methods such as directional PDs and teleprotection schemes. In addition, it is possible to combine these countermeasures and take advantage of joint approaches. Referring to the fifth column of Table 1 , a considerable portion of protection challenges could be resolved by combining the teleprotection scheme with existing local countermeasures, i.e., reprogramming of the exciting PDs and deployment of directional PDs. Last but not the least, µG-wide protection schemes provide a comprehensive solution to these challenges. Note that the sophisticated schemes customized for logic programming and remote reprogramming of existing PDs, which dictate having a master relay, also belong in the µG-wide protection schemes category. 
Conclusions
In this article, we discuss emerging protection challenges that occur subsequent to µG implementation and DER integration. These challenges dictate a new line of thinking for designing dependable and secure protection schemes. We show that novel protection schemes and technologies may need to be devised to address new challenges and needs. Having integrated DERs to DSs, some protection difficulties may appear due to the grounding strategy. Inappropriate adoption of a grounding system for DERs may lead to deterioration in sensitivity. Accordingly, the grounding strategy of DERs must be determined with respect to the grounding approach used in the main grid as well as the DER connection type, i.e., bus or unit connected. In the sequel of DER integration, PDs close to the utility grid would be faced with the loss of sensitivity and sympathetic tripping difficulties. In extreme conditions, with the presence of fault resistance, these PDs may underreach and remain stable under faulty conditions. In addition, the sound feeder would be interrupted due to the sympathetic tripping problem, which would lead to reliability difficulties. Moreover, after DER integration, the reclosing criterion is unfulfilled, and PDs may switch on to fault. These issues must be alleviated in the design of µG PSs.
Following DER integration and µG implementation, the interference of µG operation and control plans with its protection schemes should be carefully examined. To realize miscellaneous µG operation maneuvers, adaptive and more complex protection schemes are inevitably necessitated. Moreover, adopting versatile control strategies in µGs is of crucial importance from the viewpoint of PS rigorous performance.
We discussed that µG protection challenges can be resolved by means of industrial electronics solutions, particularly IED two-way communication capabilities. The µG-wide timesynchronized data provided by SMT can also be beneficial in solving these challenges. With µG-wide protection schemes in place, more precise decisions would be raised under various conditions. This article focused on protection challenges originating from inaccurate fault diagnosis due to exclusive deployment of currentbased PDs. However, other protection issues are not scrutinized here, including islanding detection, transient stability of low-inertia µGs, frequency stability of µGs in islanded-operation mode, and voltage stability of IBDERand SGBDER-integrated µGs. 
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